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Property and the Roberts Court
John G. Sprankling*
I. INTRODUCTION

How do property owners fare before the Roberts Court? Quite well.
Owners prevail in 86% of civil property-related disputes with
government entities.
But this statistic does not tell the whole story.
This Article demonstrates that under the leadership of Chief Justice
Roberts the Court has expanded the constitutional and statutory
protections afforded to owners to a greater extent than any prior Court. It
analyzes the key trends in the Court's jurisprudence that will shape its
decisions on property issues in future decades.
Almost 100 years ago, Justice Holmes remarked that government
regulation of property which went "too far" would be unconstitutional;
yet the precise line between permissible and impermissible action has
never been drawn.2 The issue has generated debate through much of
American history, particularly in recent decades as the influence of
conservative ideology on the Supreme Court has expanded. The Burger
and Rehnquist Courts were broadly viewed as more sympathetic to
private property than the Warren Court had been. However, the most
controversial anti-owner decision of the modern era, Kelo v. City of New
London,3 was decided in the final year of the Rehnquist Court. In Kelo,
the Court held that the city was empowered to condemn owner-occupied
homes and transfer them to private developers as part of an economic
redevelopment project4-a ruling that ignited a firestorm of protest
across the nation.
In his confirmation hearings to serve as Chief Justice, John Roberts
pledged to act as an "umpire" on the Court, a person with "no agenda"

* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I thank
McGeorge students Hannah Fuetsch and Alexandra Smith for their excellent research assistance.
1.
See infra Appendix.
2.
3.

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
545 U.S. 469 (2005).

4.

Id. at 489-90.
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who would merely "call balls and strikes, and not . .. pitch or bat." 5
These statements suggested that his approach to controversial issues such
as the scope of property rights would be relatively neutral-and they also
implied that he hoped to shift the entire Court in this direction. But in
fact, the Court's decisions in property-related disputes have been far
from evenhanded.
The most striking feature of the Roberts Court property
jurisprudence is its strong protection of property owners against
government conduct-in contexts ranging from wetlands regulation to
gun ownership to zoning. As discussed in Part II of the Article,
statistical analysis reveals that in civil property-related disputes between
property owners and government entities, owners almost always win in
the Roberts Court. Conversely, owners usually lose in property-related
disputes involving criminal law.
Part III analyzes four substantive themes that help to explain how the
Roberts Court has reshaped the Court's historic approach to property
law, focusing on civil cases that involve constitutional issues. 6 First, the
Court has increasingly "propertized" the Constitution by interpreting the
Second and Fourth Amendments through a property lens and by
enlarging the scope of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Second,
the Court's greater dedication to safeguarding homes has contributed
toward its pro-owner orientation. Third, the Court's decisions have
apparently been influenced by heightened distrust of government
officials to adequately respect property rights. Finally, the Court has
begun to redefine the scope of what constitutes "property" in a manner
that increasingly expands the rights of owners.
Part IV explores how the Court's property jurisprudence will evolve
in the wake of Justice Scalia's death. When the Roberts Court era began,
Scalia's influence on property doctrine was so powerful that it would
have been impossible to foresee how the Court might approach the
subject in his absence. But the four core themes developed in the first

5.

ConfirmationHearingon the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be ChiefJusticeofthe

United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of
John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the United States).
6.
Although it is conventional to categorize eras of Supreme Court jurisprudence according to
the identity of the Chief Justice, the composition of the Court inevitably changes. To date, three new
Justices have joined the Court during Chief Justice Roberts' tenure: Justice Alito replaced Justice
O'Connor in 2006; Justice Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter in 2009; and Justice Kagan replaced
Justice Stevens in 2010. In practical terms, part of the Court's heightened focus on protecting
property owners may stem from Justice Alito, who is somewhat more likely than Justice O'Connor
to adopt pro-owner positions. Justice Scalia's replacement on the Court will undoubtedly also affect
the evolution of its property jurisprudence.
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decade of the Roberts Court-spurred in part by its new
membership-will form the foundation for its property jurisprudence in
coming years, allowing us to draw preliminary conclusions about how
the Court will address property issues in the future.
II. OWNER V. GOVERNMENT: WHO WINS IN THE ROBERTS COURT?

A. Civil Cases
In McBurney v. Young, the Roberts Court unanimously proclaimed
that the right to "'take, hold and dispose of property, either real or
personal,' has long been seen as one of the privileges of
citizenship"-citing a case decided almost 200 years ago. Consistent
with this pro-owner orientation, the Court has generally shielded owners
against government action in civil cases, despite ongoing debate about
the appropriate scope of property rights.'
Discourse on protecting private property rights from government
encroachment centers on civil cases. Yet civil disputes between owners
and government entities that reach the Supreme Court are relatively rare.
Property issues surface occasionally in constitutional law, mainly in
cases involving the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But disputes
arising under the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Amendments may also
affect property rights; and federal statutes ranging from the Clean Water
Act to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Fair Housing Act
may have a similar impact. This Article accordingly takes a broad view
of what constitutes a "property-related dispute" between an owner and a
government entity, including disputes involving rules that go well
beyond core property law doctrines, as discussed in the Appendix.
In general, a "property-related dispute" as used in this Article
connotes a lawsuit between an owner and a government entity where
legislation, administrative decisions, or other official actions allegedly
infringe private property rights-the contents of the metaphorical bundle
of sticks. The Roberts Court has now generated enough decisions in
property-related disputes to permit a preliminary study of its overall
approach.

7.
133 S. Ct. 1709, 1716 (2013) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823)).
8.
As Justice Stevens observed in Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), "[d]ebates about ... regulation of private property can become just as heated as debates
about domestic partnerships."
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In order to determine how property owners fared, I examined the
twenty-nine decisions issued by the Roberts Court prior to Justice
Scalia's death that involved a civil property-related dispute in which an
owner was either a petitioner or respondent and the opposing party was a
government entity. 9 The outcome of this study was a remarkable
finding: the owner won in 86% (25/29) of these decisions. It should be
stressed that this result is based on both a relatively small number of
decisions and a generous definition of what may be classified as a
"property-related dispute." Accordingly, the finding is best viewed as a
tentative indication rather than as a statistically significant conclusion.
Yet, at a minimum, it suggests that far from serving as a neutral umpire,
the Roberts Court generally favors owners over government entities.
B. Criminal Cases

Although property-rights scholarship focuses on civil cases, property
rights are obviously at stake in a variety of lawsuits connected to
criminal law. Most commonly, an owner seeks to exclude evidence
against her in a criminal trial based on an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation or argues that a statute concerning a property-related crime
does not apply to her situation. An owner might sue for damages for an
alleged wrongful search by law enforcement officers under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents ofFederalBureau ofNarcotics.'0 Or an inmate

might complain that prison officials violated his rights to acquire or
possess property. The outcome in property-related disputes in the
criminal law setting is sharply different from the result in civil cases.
During the study period, the Roberts Court decided thirty-two
criminal property-related disputes in which the parties were a property
owner (normally one accused or convicted of a crime) and a government
entity." In contrast with the Court's rulings in the civil context, the
owner prevailed in only 38% (12/32) of these cases.
Despite the general pro-owner orientation of the Roberts Court, this
result is not surprising because these categories of cases trigger policy
concerns quite different from those in civil cases. The retribution and
deterrence goals of criminal law weigh heavily against efforts to exclude
evidence based on an allegedly unconstitutional search, especially
because police officers must be afforded a considerable amount of

9.

See the Appendix for a list of these decisions.

10.

403 U.S. 388 (1971).

11.

See the Appendix for a list of these decisions.
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deference for quick decisions made in the course of criminal
investigations.
In Bivens cases, officers are entitled to qualified
immunity from liability unless their conduct was "plainly
incompetent" 12 -a difficult standard for an owner to meet. And in cases
involving inmate property, courts typically accord officials wide
discretion given the challenges of prison operation.
But statistics-standing alone-provide only limited assistance in
understanding the Roberts Court's orientation toward property issues in
criminal proceedings. Although the Court substantially enlarged the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to property owners,1
this development is masked by the overall decision count.
III. CORE THEMES IN ROBERTS COURT PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE

A. From Umpire to Guardian
The Roberts Court has emerged as a staunch guardian of property
rights, despite John Roberts' statement during his confirmation hearings
that he would view his role as an umpire. It is hardly shocking that a
Court influenced by conservative Justices would tend to protect private
property. Nor should an observer be startled if the decision of a Justice
in a specific case might appear to differ from general comments he or she
made during confirmation hearings.
Yet two aspects of the Roberts Court approach to property are
somewhat surprising: (1) the extent to which it favors owners over
government in civil property-related disputes, as discussed in Part II
above; and (2) the specific mechanisms that the Court has utilized in its
property jurisprudence, as discussed below.
Four key themes dominate the Court's property jurisprudence and
thus help to explain its focus on protecting owners in civil propertyrelated disputes. First, more than its predecessors, the Roberts Court has
engaged in "propertizing" the Constitution: it is reinterpreting key
constitutional provisions through a property lens in a manner than tends
to safeguard owners.1 4 In a similar vein, it exhibits significantly greater

12.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
13.
See infra Section III.B.3.
14.
The same tendency is evident in non-constitutional decisions, particularly those that
involve statutory construction. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (Fair Housing Act); Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)
(Clean Water Act); United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007) (Comprehensive
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reverence for the home than its predecessors, increasingly shielding the
home from government action. A third theme seems to be distrust of
government officials to respect property rights, which is deployed to
justify enhanced protection for owners. Finally, and more broadly, the
Court is shifting the boundaries of what constitutes "property" in a
manner that tends to favor owners.
B. "Propertizing"the Constitution
1. Constitutional Property
Scholars have viewed the Constitution as creating two distinct forms
of protection for private property, one general and one specific. The Due
Process Clause 5 and the Takings Clause' 6 of the Fifth Amendment
protect "property" in general against certain actions of the federal
government, and the Fourteenth Amendment extends the scope of these
clauses to encompass actions by state and local governments. 17
"Property," as used in this context, is defined by a source outside of the
Constitution itself, most commonly state law. In contrast, the Third and
Fourth Amendments extend constitutional protection to specific objects
of property rights. The Third Amendment protects the "house,"" while
the Fourth Amendment applies to "houses, papers, and effects."' 9 Thus,
the Third and Fourth Amendments may each be viewed as creating a sort
of "super-property right" whose interpretation is governed by federal
law. Due to their constitutional genesis, these super-property rights
necessarily trump inconsistent state law.
The dominant theme in the property jurisprudence of the Roberts
Court is what might be the "propertization" of the Constitution, that is,
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006) (Clean Water Act); Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006)
(Medicaid statute). See also the Appendix for other cited Roberts Court decisions.
15.
The Due Process Clause provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of ...
property,
without due process of law. . .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16.
The Takings Clause provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17.
The term "property" also occurs in Article IV of the Constitution, which authorizes
Congress to dispose of and otherwise deal with "the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
18.
The Third Amendment provides: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.

.

19.
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . .
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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expanding property themes in constitutional doctrine. This transition is
reflected in the Court's revolutionary decisions reinterpreting the
protection accorded to specific forms of property in the Second and
Fourth Amendments, and in its major opinions enlarging the scope of the
Takings Clause to protect property in general.
The Roberts Court has reshaped Second Amendment jurisprudence
to the point where the amendment comes close to creating a new specific
constitutional property right-the right to possess a handgun. It has
transformed the standard used to determine whether a search has
occurred under the Fourth Amendment by adopting a property-based
approach, overturning almost fifty years of case law. Finally, it has
broadened the reach of the Takings Clause, thus enhancing the ability of
property owners to seek compensation for government action. 20
To a degree, this trend continues an approach established during the
Burger and Rehnquist Court eras. But the Roberts Court has proven to
be more aggressive in propertizing the Constitution than past courts have
been-despite its repeated endorsement of the maxim that the Court
should be particularly reluctant to overturn prior decisions concerning
property rights.2
The key Roberts Court opinions in the propertization process tend to
share three characteristics. First, they were written by Justices associated
with the conservative wing of the Court-Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Alito. Second, these decisions generally seek to
establish bright-line rules, as opposed to case-by-case standards. Finally,
they often reflect an originalist orientation, grounded in historical
analysis of property doctrines as they existed when the Bill of Rights was
ratified.
2. Second Amendment
The Second Amendment attracted little judicial attention for most of

20.
In contrast, the Roberts Court has done less to expand the boundaries of the Due Process
Clause in the property context. In Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), the Court held that merely
mailing notices of a tax sale to the owner did not comply with the Clause where the notices were
returned as undeliverable. See also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007) (jury
award of punitive damages based in part on desire to punish persons not before the trial court
violated the Due Process Clause as a "taking of 'property' . . . without due process").
21.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (observing
that in applying stare decisis "reliance interests are important considerations in property . . . cases ");
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) (quoting State Oil Co.
v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)) (noting that "reliance on a judicial opinion is a significant reason to
adhere to it . . . especially 'in cases involving property . . . rights').
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our nation's history. For decades, the Supreme Court interpreted the
amendment as only protecting a collective right to "keep and bear"
weapons for the limited purpose of military service, not an individual
right to keep and bear weapons as a general matter. Thus, in the 1939
decision of United States v. Miller,22 the Court stressed that the
amendment was adopted "[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the
continuation and render possible the effectiveness" of militia forces.23
Consistent with this interpretation, the Court had never struck down any
law regulating weapons as unconstitutional.
The Roberts Court revolutionized this field in its 2008 decision in
Districtof Columbia v. Heller,2 4 holding for the first time that the Second
Amendment guarantees "the individual right to possess and carry
weapons" without any necessary connection to militia service.25 Heller,
who wished to keep a handgun in his home for personal defense,
challenged a District of Columbia statute which effectively prohibited
the possession of such weapons.2 6 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion from an originalist perspective.2 7
He developed a
comprehensive textual and historical analysis to justify the conclusion
that the amendment recognized an individual right. In his view, there
was "no doubt ... that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms." 28
Scalia conceded that the right was not unlimited; it "was not a right
to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and
,,29
h
for whatever purpose,
just as the First Amendment did not allow
30
He suggested that certain existing
citizens to speak for any purpose.
prohibitions on the possession of weapons by the mentally ill or
regulations on the commercial sale of weapons might well be
constitutional. 3 ' But he reasoned that the District of Columbia ban was
unconstitutional because it prohibited possession of a handgun in "the

22.

307 U.S. 174 (1939).

23.

Id. at 178.

24.
554 U.S. 570 (2008). For an overview of Heller, see Symposium, Gun Control and the
Second Amendment: Developments and Controversies in the Wake of District of Columbia v. Heller
and McDonald v. Chicago, 39 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1339 (2012).
25.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
26.

Id. at 574-75.

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 572.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 626.

30.

Id. at 595.

31.

Id. at 626-27.

2016

PROPERTY AND THE ROBERTS COURT

9

home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute."

32

Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that
the Second Amendment was incorporated into the concept of due process
in the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus applied to the states. 3 3 Justice
Alito's majority opinion characterized Heller as protecting "the right to
keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense." 34 Largely relying
on the historical analysis in Heller, it found the right to be "deeply
rooted" in the nation's history35 and "among those fundamental rights
necessary to our system of ordered liberty." 36 Accordingly, the majority
seemed to hold that the Second Amendment was a "liberty" within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37
While this approach would be consistent with the rationale used in past
incorporation decisions, the classification was not expressly used in
McDonald.
Should the individual right recognized in Heller and McDonald be
characterized as a property right? As Justice Stevens observed in his
McDonald dissent, "in some respects the substantive right at issue [to
keep and bear arms] may be better viewed as a property right," 38 rather
than as a "liberty." He noted that "[i]nterests in the possession of
chattels have traditionally been viewed as property interests subject to
definition and regulation by the States." 3 9 In turn, Justice Scalia retorted:
"Never mind that the right to bear arms sounds mighty like a liberty; and
never mind that the 'liberty clause' is really a Due Process Clause which
explicitly protects 'property."' 4 0 Here, Scalia seemed to straddle the

32.
33.

Id. at 628.
561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). For an overview of McDonald, see Symposium, supra note 24.

34.

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749-50.

35.
Id. at 768 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
36.
Id. at 778.
37.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 799 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia cited his concurring opinion in United States
v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), to support this argument. There he lamented that the Court's
majority recognized only "liberty" interests as fundamental rights under substantive due process
analysis, even though the Due Process Clause encompasses both "liberty" and "property." Id. at 4142 (Scalia, J., concurring). An example is Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977),
where the Court invalidated a city housing ordinance that restricted which family members could
live in a home. In Moore, the Court viewed the ordinance as interfering with a liberty interest
("freedom of personal choice in matters of... family life") rather than a property right (the right to
use a home as the owner wishes). Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.

632, 639-40 (1974)).
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fence, arguing first that the protected interest is a "liberty" under the
clause, but then suggesting it alternatively could be covered under the
"property" strand.
In a functional sense, the individual right to keep and bear arms can
be described as a property right, as Stevens suggested. Over seventy
years ago, the Supreme Court endorsed the conventional view that
property rights in a physical object are the rights to "possess, use and
dispose of it." 4 ' Four years after McDonald, the Court applied the
bundle-of-rights analysis to a firearm in Henderson v. United States.42
There, a federal law made it illegal for Henderson, a convicted felon, to
"possess" a firearm, but the government interpreted the law as also
barring Henderson from transferring his firearms to a friend.4 3 Justice
Kagan's unanimous opinion found for Henderson, explaining that the
statute interfered with only "a single incident of ownership-one of the
proverbial sticks in the bundle of property rights-by preventing the
felon from knowingly possessing his .. . guns." 44 It reasoned that the
government had "conflate[d] the right to possess a gun with another
incident of ownership, which [the statute] does not affect: the right
merely to sell or otherwise dispose of that item." 45 Viewed from this
bundle-of-sticks framework, the right to "possess and carry" weapons
recognized in Heller seems indistinguishable from the traditional rights
to "possess and use" any tangible object.
The categorization of the right to possess and carry weapons as either
a liberty right or a property right has consequences. As Justice Stevens
noted, property rights in chattels have traditionally been defined and
regulated by state law.4 6 If the Second Amendment right recognized in
Heller is viewed in property terms, then states may have greater freedom
to regulate the right. Conversely, if the right is conceptualized as a
liberty interest, this might narrow its scope in certain situations. One
question, for example, is whether Heller protects the right to own
particular weapons (a property right) or merely a general right to own
weapons (a liberty right).47

41.
42.

United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015).

43.

Id. at 1783.

44.
45.

Id. at 1784.
Id. at 1785.

46.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

47.

See John L. Schwab & Thomas G. Sprankling, Houston, We Have A Problem: Does the

Second Amendment Create a Property Right to a Specific Firearm?, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR

158 (2012).
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Ultimately, it may be appropriate to view the Second Amendment as
creating a sort of super-property right that enjoys greater immunity from
state regulation than property rights arising under state law because of its
constitutional genesis-like the specialized property rights arising under
the Third and Fourth Amendments. At a minimum, however, the
Roberts Court has revolutionized this area by creating a property-like
right that is akin to the specific property rights protected by the
Constitution.
3. Fourth Amendment
Traditionally, the definition of a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment was tied to common law trespass. Under this
property-based approach, if the entry of government officials onto real
property for the purpose of obtaining information constituted a trespass,
it was deemed to be a Fourth Amendment search. 4 8 The historic test,
then, focused on places, not people. 4 9 Almost fifty years ago, the Court
appeared to reject this approach in the 1967 decision of Katz v. United
States, holding instead that a search occurred when government efforts to
obtain information violated a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy.o Katz essentially reversed the historic test by focusing on
people, not places.
For almost five decades, it was generally understood that the Katz
doctrine had replaced the historic test. But as part of its propertization
campaign, the Roberts Court has resurrected the property approach by
holding that the Fourth Amendment carves out certain constitutionally
protected areas; entry into these areas is deemed to be a search,
regardless of whether the owner or occupant has a reasonable expectation
of privacy.5
The groundbreaking decision was United States v. Jones,52 where
police attached a small global positioning tracking system to a car
"owned" by Jones,53 who was under suspicion for narcotics trafficking.54

48.

See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51-52,57,59 (1967).

49.

See id.

50.

See 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).

51. For detailed analysis of decisions in this area, see Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and
Curtilage: What Jardines Teaches and What It Leaves Unanswered, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1289 (2015);
see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v.
Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2012).

52.

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

53.
The car was registered in the name of Jones' wife, but was exclusively driven by Jones;
the Court noted that "[i]f Jones was not the owner he had at least the property rights of a bailee." Id.
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The trial court denied Jones' motion to suppress the evidence obtained
through the GPS device on the basis that it was the product of a
warrantless search, and he was convicted. 5 Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor ruled that this conduct
a
search-and
therefore
violated
the
Fourth
constituted
Amendment-based on an originalist approach.56 Writing for the
majority, Scalia relied almost exclusively on real property authorities,
even though a car is classified as a chattel.
He stressed that "[t]he
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information," which "would have been considered a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted."5 1
With little analysis, he then asserted that the Katz test had been "added
to, not substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test." 59 Under this
approach, a Fourth Amendment search occurs where "the Government
obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally
protected area." 60 "What we apply," Scalia concluded, "is an 18thcentury guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we believe must
provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was
adopted." 61 Concurring in the result, Justice Alito criticized the revival
of the property test, noting the irony of using "18th-century tort law" to
deal with a "21st-century surveillance technique." 6 2
One year later, the Court revisited the scope of Jones in Florida v.
Jardines.63 The case arose when police officers took a drug-sniffing dog
to the front porch of Jardines' home; based on the dog's indication that
drugs were present, the police obtained a search warrant and found
marijuana plants inside.64 The trial court accepted Jardines' argument
that the use of the dog constituted a Fourth Amendment search, but the

at 949 n.2.
54. Id. at 948.
55. Id. at 948-49.
56.

Id. at 949-54.

57.
58.
59.

See id. at 948-54.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 952.

60.

Id. at 950 n.3.

61.
Id. at 953. In her concurrence, Sotomayor emphasized that "the trespassory test applied in
the majority's opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government
physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs." Id. at 955 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
62.
Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
63.

133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).

64.

Id. at 1414.
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state appellate court rejected the claim. 65 The Supreme Court disagreed,
finding that the police conduct did constitute a search.66
Writing for the majority-which included Justices Thomas,
Ginsburg,
Sotomayor,
and Kagan-Justice
Scalia began by
characterizing Jones as holding that a Fourth Amendment search occurs
when the government obtains information by physically intruding
"on ...
houses, papers, or effects,"6 7 thus somewhat clarifying the
meaning of "constitutionally protected area." Under this principle, the
case was "a straightforward one," 68 because the front porch of a home
was part of the curtilage-"the area 'immediately surrounding and
associated with the home."' 69 Scalia pointed out that the curtilage has
long been regarded as part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes,
citing authorities which included Blackstone's famous 1769 treatise,
Commentaries on the Laws of England.70 He distinguished the curtilage
from a privately-owned open field because "such fields are not
enumerated in the Amendment's text." 7 ' The dissenters, led by Justice
Alito, did not challenge the use of the Jones property test as a general
matter, but instead argued that because members of the public had an
implied license to approach the front door of a home, no trespass had
occurred.7 2
In sum, the Roberts Court transformed Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in Jones and Jardines by resurrecting the property-based
approach.
Notably, all eight current Justices have endorsed this
approach. 7 3 These decisions significantly enlarge the Fourth Amendment
protection for property owners: the entry of officials into a
"constitutionally protected area" for the purpose of obtaining information
is a Fourth Amendment "search" even if the owner had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area. In his Jardines opinion, Scalia
commented that "[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights

65.
66.

Id. at 1413.
Id. at 1417-18.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1414 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950, n.3).
Id.
Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
Id. at 1414-15 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223, *225).

71.
Id. at 1414 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
72.
See id. at 1420-24 (Alito, J., dissenting).
73.
Six current Justices approved this test in Jones or Jardines;and eight current Justices later
joined the unanimous opinion in Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam),
which extended the test by holding that a satellite-based monitoring device attached to a person's
body was a "search," despite the lack of any expectation of privacy.
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baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy."74 But does it?
The Jones-Jardines duo suggests that the Amendment now
encompasses a broad range of areas that are open to public view
including: (a) the fenced or unfenced front yard, side yard, and backyard
of a detached single-family home; (b) the airspace over a home; (c)
outbuildings near a home, such as a garage, shed, or barn; and (d) the
exterior and interior of airplanes, boats, cars, and trucks. Moreover, readoption of the property approach raises difficult questions about how it
applies to forms of group housing other than the paradigmatic detached
single-family house, such as a shared hallway or common recreational
facilities in a townhouse or condominium development. In short, these
decisions seem to open the door to a plethora of future cases which will
test the outer limits of the property approach.
4. Fifth Amendment
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been a major
property rights battlefield for decades.
The multi-factor test for
determining a regulatory taking, as adopted by the Burger Court in the
landmark 1978 decision of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York,76 was criticized by some as failing to adequately protect
private property against government action. An initial effort to limit the
Penn Central approach came four years later when the Court held in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. that a "permanent
physical occupation" of an owner's property by government or
authorized by government is a taking, regardless of the government
purpose it serves.
The Rehnquist Court continued to erode the Penn Central standard
in later terms, particularly by adopting two new bright-line or
"categorical" tests that broadened the regulatory takings doctrine. In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,79 the Court held that a
regulation which denies an owner "all economically beneficial or

74.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.

75.
See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (holding that a city
ordinance which required hotel operators to make their registries available to police officers without
a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment).
76.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
77.
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
78.

Id. at 441.

79.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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productive use of land"so is a compensable taking unless it is justified by
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance."'
And in the twin decisions of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission8 2

and Dolan v. City of Tigard83 the Court established a second categorical
test: the government's exaction of a right in real property in return for a
discretionary land use approval is a taking if (a) there is no "essential
nexus" between the exaction and a legitimate state interest8 4 or (b) the
exaction is not roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed
project.

The first Takings Clause case to reach the Roberts Court, Wilkie v.
Robbins,86 was decided in 2007.7 The case is noteworthy because the
Court refused to create a new categorical test, in contrast to its later
decisions which expand the scope of the Takings Clause. Robbins, a
Wyoming rancher, asserted that Bureau of Land Management officials
had engaged in a "campaign of harassment and intimidation" against him
in order to obtain an easement across his land, asserting damage claims
under both Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of

'

Narcotics" and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.8 9 The district court refused to dismiss these claims, and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. 90 Before the Supreme Court the key issue was whether
a Bivens claim should be recognized, though Robbins' brief framed the
issue more broadly: "[C]an government officials avoid the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against taking property without just
compensation by using their regulatory powers to harass, punish, and
coerce a private citizen into giving the Government his property without
payment?" 9
Taking a pragmatic view-notably absent in later Roberts Court
80. Id. at 1015 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)).
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1029.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.

85. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
86.
551 U.S. 537 (2007).
87. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs
Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23.
88.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
89.
Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 541, 547-49. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (2012).
90.

Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 548-49.

91.
Id. at 556 n.8 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 21, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007)
(No. 06-219)).
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property decisions-Justice Souter's majority opinion sidestepped the
takings issue and refused to extend the Bivens approach.92 Joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and
Alito, Souter reasoned that Robbins had adequate avenues to pursue his
claims and, moreover, that it would be difficult to define a workable
cause of action. 93 He stressed that government in its capacity as a
landowner was entitled "to drive a hard bargain" 94 with its neighbors,
making it impossible to determine when it "demanded too much and
went too far." 95 Interestingly, it was Justices Ginsburg and Stevens,
representing the more liberal wing of the Court, who argued for an
expansive reading of the Fifth Amendment: "The Fifth Amendment ...
must be read to forbid government action calculated to acquire private
property coercively and cost free, and measures taken in retaliation for
the owner's resistance to uncompensated taking." 9 6
But three subsequent Roberts Court decisions97 have significantly
broadened the scope of the Takings Clause: Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
98
Protection,
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,9
and Horne v. Department of Agriculture.'00 Taken together, these
decisions further weaken the Penn Central approach in favor of
sweeping categorical rules which make it more likely that government
action will be deemed a taking.
The 2010 decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment is important
because it signals that a majority of the current Court agrees that a
judicial decision which eliminates or substantially changes even a minor
property right would violate the Constitution-a substantial expansion of

92.
Id. at 567-68. Part of the explanation for the outcome in Wilkie was the continued
antipathy of Justices Scalia and Thomas toward creating any new cause of action based onBivens, as
reflected in Thomas' concurrence, which Scalia joined. Id. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93.

Id. at 555-62 (majority opinion).

94.
95.
96.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 584 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

97.
The only other Takings Clause decision by the Roberts Court, Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012), broke little new ground. In an opinion written
by Justice Ginsburg, all eight participating Justices rejected the assertion that temporary
government-induced flooding was automatically exempt from Takings Clause liability. Id. at 522.
This was an unsurprising result given the Court's prior decisions.
98.
560 U.S. 702 (2010). For an overview of Stop the Beach Renourishment, see Laura S.
Underkuffler, Judicial Takings: A Medley ofMisconceptions, 61 SYRACUSE L. REv. 203 (2011).
99.

133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).

100.

135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
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the legal shelter provided to owners.' 0 ' Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito would reach this result through the Takings
Clause,1 0 2 while Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor would do so through
the Due Process Clause.' 03
Stop the Beach Renourishment was decided against the backdrop of

three key precedents. In its landmark Penn Central decision, the Court
held that in determining whether government action has effected a taking
of real property a court should consider the "extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole," rather than simply the portion of the
property directly affected by the particular action.1 0 4 But a year later, in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Court found a compensable taking

when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ruled that the owner's property
was subject to the federal navigational servitude.'0 o
The majority
opinion explained that there were a "number of expectancies embodied
in the concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently important,
the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the
management of the landowner's property."1 06 Because of the traditional
importance of the right to exclude, "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property," the Court
concluded that a taking had occurred even though the owner retained all
of the other sticks in the metaphorical bundle. 0 7 The same theme that a
taking could be found when a single important property right was taken
resurfaced eight years later in Hodel v. Irving, where a federal regulation
prevented Native Americans from devising extremely small fractional
interests in Indian trust lands, as part of an effort to combat excessive
fragmentation of property rights.'0 o
The Court again stressed the
importance of the right, observing that "the right to pass on property-to
one's family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal
system since feudal times."1 09
In contrast to these decisions, Stop the Beach Renourishment

involved two minor property rights."10 The petitioners, owners of ocean-

101.
102.

See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
See id. at 715.

103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
444 U.S. 164, 170-80 (1979).
Id. at 179.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 176.
481 U.S. 704, 706-10 (1987).
Id. at 716.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 711 (2010)
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front property, asserted that a decision of the Florida Supreme Court
which rejected their lawsuit against the state's beach restoration project
had eliminated-and thus illegally "taken"-two common law rights that
were akin to easements: "the right to receive accretions to their property"
from the ocean and "the right to have the contact of their property with
the water remain intact.""' All eight participating Justices ruled for the
state, on the basis that the petitioners had never held such rights and,
therefore, were not injured by the Florida decision.112
But Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
reached well beyond this point to assert the novel claim that the Takings
Clause encompassed the taking of property by judicialaction, in addition
to executive and legislative action." 3 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
first asserted that the Court's precedents recognized an additional
categorical test-that "States effect a taking if they recharacterize as
public property what was previously private property."1 4 He then
explained that this test should apply to judicial action because (a) there
was "no textual justification" in the Takings Clause for holding that the
existence of such a taking should vary "according to the branch of
government effecting the expropriation"" 5 and (b) "[i]t would be absurd
to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids
it to do by legislative fiat."1 6 The logical implication of this view, of
course, is that federal courts have the ultimate power to determine state
property law, not state courts." 7 Although the other four Justices refused
to embrace the judicial takings theory, Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor
argued that substantive due process could provide similar protection for

(citing Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102
(Fla. 2008), aff'd sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. 702).
111.

Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 711-12.

112.
See id. at 733; id. at 742 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113.
See id. at 713-15 (plurality opinion).
114.
Id. at 713. The plurality opinion observed that this test was part of the "general principles
of our takings jurisprudence." Id.
115.
Id. at 714. This textual analysis has limited value, however, since most scholars agree that
the Takings Clause was originally intended only to apply to physical takings, not regulatory takings.
See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) ("[E]arly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause
embraced regulations of property at all.").
116.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 714.
117.
In fact, the Supreme Court sometimes opines on general principles of property law without
citing state-specific authorities. See, e.g., Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 1257, 1265-66 (2014) (discussing law relating to easements and reversionary interests).
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property owners."' Without citing direct authority, they reasoned that a
judicial decision which "eliminates or substantially changes established
property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is
'arbitrary or irrational' under the Due Process Clause."119
Similarly, the plurality opinion seemed to assume that the loss of
even one minor property right would require compensation under the
Takings Clause. Rather than explaining why the two easement-like
rights at issue were important enough to satisfy the Kaiser Aetna and
Hodel standards, it merely asserted that the "deprivation of an
established property right" would be a taking, even if an owner retained
virtually all other property rights.1 20 Even assuming arguendo that the
Florida Supreme Court decision did eliminate two easement-like rights,
the owners still held fee simple absolute title to their respective parcels,
with all of the core property rights traditionally associated with the
metaphorical bundle of sticks, including the rights to possess, use,
exclude, and transfer. Thus, the extent of the interference with the
owners' rights was minor and would not rise to the level of a taking
under either Kaiser Aetna or Hodel.
Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, who concurred in the result
without joining the plurality rationale, appeared to agree that even the
loss of a minor property right would violate the Constitution, though not
the Takings Clause.121 Their concurrence noted that the elimination or
substantial change of "an established property right" could "be set aside
as a deprivation of property" under the Due Process Clause-without any
discussion of the importance of the right.1 2 2
In sum, five current Justices endorse the view that a judicial decision
which eliminates or substantially changes even a minor property right
would violate the Constitution under some circumstances. At best, this
rule is too vague to be meaningful. There is no clear definition of what
constitutes a "property right," much less any understanding about what
constitutes a "substantial" change in such a right. Although there is
widespread agreement about the content of what may be called major
property rights-such as the classic rights to possess, use, exclude, and

118.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 735-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119.
Id. at 737 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)). But see
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (observing that a judicial
decision which "constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant
precedents" would be a taking of property without due process of law).
120.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 726 n.9.
121.
Id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122.
Id.
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transfer-there is a host of relatively minor entitlements accompanying
an estate which might or might not be classified as distinct "property
rights," depending on how finely entitlements are sliced. For example,
some states have altered the adversity element of adverse possession by
judicial decisions which replace the good faith test with the objective
test.1 23 If an owner's entitlement to defeat an adverse possession claim
by relying on the stricter good faith test is viewed as a type of "property
right," then such a decision might be viewed as a "substantial change" to
this right-which would entitle him to compensation from the state if he
loses title to an adverse claimant under the objective test.
Three years later, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District expanded the Nollan-Dolan rule by holding that it also applied to
fees, not simply to real property exactions.1 24 Both Nollan and Dolan
involved the narrow situation where a government entity demands one or
more easements over an owner's real property in exchange for a
discretionary land use approval.1 25 Neither decision considered whether
the same rule would apply to fees imposed on new developments-such
as payments to offset the impact of a new residential subdivision on a
municipal library, park, or school-which are widely used by local
governments to offset the cost of new infrastructure. By extending the
Nollan-Dolan restrictions to fees, Koontz curbs the traditional discretion
that local governments have enjoyed in land use planning and thereby
enlarges the constitutional protection afforded to owners.1 2 6 Before
Koontz it was widely believed that the Takings Clause did not apply to
fees or other general monetary obligations.
In Koontz, a local district denied approval for Koontz's plan to fill
his wetland parcel in preparation for a building project because he

123.
See, e.g., Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1988). Under the
good faith test, the adverse claimant must actually believe that she owns the land, while under the
objective test the claimant's state of mind is irrelevant. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING
PROPERTY LAW 458 (3d ed. 2012).
&

124.
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598-602 (2013). For an overview of Koontz, see Lee Anne Fennell
Eduardo M. Pefialver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287.

125.
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994).
126.
Another aspect of Koontz merits mention: the majority's endorsement of externality
theory. Advocates of the law and economics movement have long argued that land use regulation
should be structured to achieve economic efficiency by requiring developers to internalize their
negative externalities. In Koontz, a majority of the Court expressly endorsed this view for the first
time: "Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark
of responsible land-use policy . . . ." Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595. In a broad sense, such
internalization is the practical effect of the Nollan-Dolan approach. The intriguing issue is whether
this view might affect other regulatory takings doctrines, such as the Lucas test.
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refused to agree to either of the two concessions the district suggested.1 2 7
One of the alternatives required that he pay for improvements to districtowned wetlands several miles from the project site.1 28 Lower state courts
reasoned that this violated the Nollan-Dolan test due to the lack of both
an essential nexus and rough proportionality.1 2 9 But the Florida Supreme
Court reversed. 3 0 It reasoned that the test did not apply to (a) a demand
for money or (b) denial of a permit for the applicant's failure to make a
requested concession to the district.' 3 ' Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice Alito's majority opinion
which overturned the Florida decision on both bases.13 2
The backdrop for Koontz was the Court's 1998 decision in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, which involved a federal statute that required the
former employers of retired miners to pay retroactively for their health
care benefits.' 33 Four members of the Court held that the statute was a
regulatory taking. 14 While concurring with the result, Justice Kennedy
disagreed with the plurality's rationale on the basis that the Takings
Clause did not apply to a purely monetary obligation.13 He stressed that
a "constant limitation" in past regulatory takings had been that "a
specific property right or interest has been at stake."13 6 In contrast, he
observed, the statute at issue did not affect an "identified property
interest," but merely required the performance of an act-a monetary
payment that might come from any source.17
The Koontz majority attempted to distinguish Eastern Enterprises on

the theory that the monetary obligation at issue "burdened petitioner's
ownership of a specific parcel of land," and thus somewhat resembled a
lien.13 It asserted that the "fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link
between the government's demand and a specific parcel of real

127.

Id. at 2591-93.

128.
129.

Id. at 2593.
Id.

130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 2593-94. The Florida Supreme Court also distinguished Koontz from Nollan and
Dolan on the basis that the district did not approve Koontz's request on condition that he make the
payment, but rather denied his application because he refused to do so. Id.
132.
Id. at 2603.
133.
524 U.S. 498, 504-15 (1998).
134.
Id. at 503, 538.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 540-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 540.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013).
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property." 3 9 This distinction is unconvincing.
A lien burdens a
particular property in the sense that the property can ultimately be sold to
satisfy the debt secured by the lien, which certainly was not the case in
Koontz. Moreover, any "link" between the district's demand and
Koontz's land is irrelevant. The point is that the district asked Koontz to
pay a specific amount, which he could have obtained from any source-a
bank account, lottery winnings, or a loan from a friend. Thus, the case
did not involve a taking of an "identified property interest."1 40
After Koontz, it is clear that the Nollan-Dolan test applies to
monetary exactions in the land use context-despite the obvious
difficulty of distinguishing between an unconstitutional exaction and a
legitimate tax. But the outer limits of the Koontz approach are unclear.
The majority observed that Koontz "does not ask us to hold that the
government can commit a regulatory taking by directing someone to
spend money."141 But because the majority's attempt to distinguish
Eastern Enterprises is unconvincing, Koontz may well serve as a
stepping stone toward a future decision which applies a Takings Clause
analysis outside of the land use setting, potentially to any monetary
demand made by government.1 42
Finally, the 2015 decision in Horne v. Department of Agriculture 43
safeguards property rights by broadening the categorical test established
in Loretto. 144
Horne arose out of a program established by the
Department of Agriculture to assist raisin growers by stabilizing the
national price for raisins. 145 It required each grower to physically set
aside a certain portion of the crop, which the government could then sell,
donate, or otherwise dispose of as appropriate to promote the raisin
market; the government took title to these raisins.1 4 6 Each grower,

139.

Id. at 2600.

140.
Id. at 2599 (quoting Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Nonetheless, the Koontz majority noted that "this case does not implicate the question whether
monetary exactions must be tied to a particular parcel of land in order to constitute a taking." Id. at
2600 n.2.
141.
Id. at 2600.
142.
The second prong of Koontz was less controversial. As Justice Alito summarized, "[t]he
principles that undergird our decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not change depending on whether the
government approves a permit on the condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a
permit because the applicant refuses to do so." Id. at 2595.

143.

135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).

144.
See id. at 2427-28; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Horne also breaks new ground in defining the extent of constitutional protection for personal
property. See infra discussion Section III.E.3.
145.

Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424-25.

146.

Id. at 2424.
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however, was entitled to receive its proportionate share of net proceeds
from such government sales.1 4 7 The Homes refused to set aside any
portion of their crop, and instead sued on a takings theory, arguing that
these facts constituted a permanent physical occupation under Loretto.148
The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, inter alia, viewing the government
action as a use restriction, not a physical appropriation, because the
Homes were not completely divested of their property rights.1 49
Writing for a majority of eight Justices, Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that the government action was a "clear physical taking"
because the growers lost "the entire 'bundle' of property rights in the
appropriated raisins-'the rights to possess, use and dispose of' them." 5 o
Ironically, all parties agreed that the government could constitutionally
prohibit the sale of raisins altogether without incurring takings
liability.'' Yet even though "[a] physical taking of raisins and a
regulatory limit on production may have the same economic impact on a
grower," the majority explained that the Court's takings jurisprudence
distinguished sharply between an appropriation and a mere regulation.15 2
Despite the majority's assertion that it was merely applying Loretto
to a "clear physical taking," Horne enlarges the Loretto test.15 The
Loretto approach was designed to deal with the extraordinary situation
where the government eliminates all of an owner's property rights
through a permanent physical occupation. 5 4 In this narrow situation, the
Loretto Court concluded, the policy reasons for the government action
147.

Id.

148.
Id. at 2424-25.
149.
Id. at 2425 (citing Home v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014),
rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015)). The Ninth Circuit also grounded its ruling on the theory that the
Takings Clause accords less protection to personal property than to real property. Horne, 750 F.3d
at 1139-40. The Supreme Court's rejection of this view is discussed in Section III.E.3.
150.
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435 (1982)). Eight Justices joined in Parts I and II of the opinion, which are the portions
at issue in the text discussion; only Justice Sotomayor dissented from these parts.
151.
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
152.
Id. at 2428 (majority opinion).
153.
In addition, the majority opinion in Horne may hint at an expansion of the Penn Central
test. The Penn Central Court stated that its prior decisions had identified "several factors" that had
"particular significance" in determining whether a taking had occurred. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). It then listed three factors that should be considered in
this process: the economic impact on the claimant, the extent of interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and "the character of the governmental action." Id. But Horne
appears to characterize these factors merely as examples, not as an exclusive listing, when it notes
that the Penn Centraltest requires consideration of factors "such as" the specified three. Horne, 135
S. Ct. at 2427 (emphasis added). A future Court might view this phrase as an opening that permits
additional factors to be used in the Penn Centralanalysis.
154.
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36.
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were irrelevant. 5' 5 It stressed that such an occupation of real property
"effectively destroys" an owner's traditional rights to possess, use, and
dispose of property.1 5 6 In particular, the Court observed that such an
occupation would "ordinarily empty the right [to dispose of property] of
any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the
property." 5 7
This rationale does not apply to the facts in Horne.
Because the raisins were produced for commercial sale, only the right to
dispose of them was relevant-and it was not destroyed, because the
growers retained the right to share in proceeds from government sales. 5 1
After Horne, even a government "occupation" which leaves an owner
with substantial property rights would seem to be a per se taking,
regardless of the underlying policy basis.1 59
Taken together, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Koontz, and Horne
enlarge the meaning of the term "taken" as used in the Takings Clause,
extending its scope to include new situations and making it more likely
that government action will be deemed a compensable taking. In this
area, the Roberts Court is following the lead of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts by broadening the categorical tests for assessing takings liability,
thereby expanding the rights of property owners. Based on the first
decade of its Takings Clause jurisprudence, there is every reason to
believe that the Roberts Court will continue this expansion in future
decisions.
C. Home Protection
The home is the embodiment of the American dream, a symbol of
autonomy, family, privacy, and security. Thus, the law traditionally
affords stronger protection to the home than to other forms of property.
For example, the "house" is shielded against undue government
intrusions by the text of the Third and Fourth Amendments;1 6 0 and past
155.

See id. at 434-36.

156.
Id. at 435.
157.
Id. at 436.
158.
Thus, Justice Sotomayor observed in her dissent that "it is not a per se taking if it does not
result in the destruction of every property right." Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
159.
Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit decision recognized, it was not clear in Horne that a
physical taking had occurred because the Hornes never surrendered possession of the raisins to the
government. Rather than trying to seize the raisins, the federal government initiated an enforcement
action against the Homes, which resulted in a monetary award against them for damages and civil
penalties. Id. at 2424-25 (majority opinion). In this sense, Horne seems to expand the Loretto rule
beyond physical seizures to what might be called unjustified demands for physical seizures.
160.

See U.S. CONST. amend. III; id. amend. IV.
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Courts have often interpreted other constitutional amendments more
broadly when the conduct in question occurs in a home.161
Yet the level of respect that the Supreme Court accords to the home
varies over time. In the controversial decision of Kelo v. City of New
London, for example, a majority of the Rehnquist Court concluded that
homes were not entitled to more protection from eminent domain than
other types of property.1 6 2 This sparked a stinging dissent from Justice
O'Connor, who complained, inter alia, that "[n]othing is to prevent the
State from replacing . .. any home with a shopping mall."1 63
The Roberts Court evidences unusually strong reverence for the
home in both rhetoric and substance. Justice Souter expressed this
sentiment in an early Roberts Court decision when he observed that
"[w]e have . . lived our whole national history with an understanding of
'the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle [to the point that t]he
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown.""1 64 Exalting the home as the most favored type of property, the
Roberts Court has interpreted constitutional provisions and federal
statutes in a manner that singles out houses for enhanced protection.
This is particularly true in its key decisions interpreting the scope of the
Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.1 65 All eight current
Justices have joined in decisions containing broad language that extols
the importance of the home.
The Court's landmark 2008 decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller, interpreting the Second Amendment to create a personal right to
bear arms, cannot be separated from the factual context in which it arose:

161.
See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment
barred the government from prosecuting a person for possession of obscenity within a home, but not
elsewhere); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment prevented city from enforcing an ordinance that restricted the categories of relatives
who could live in a home); see also D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006).
162.

545 U.S. 469 (2005).

163.
Id. at 503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 307 (1958)).
165.
Another example is Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013), where the
Court rejected the argument that a floating home was a "vessel" under the Federal Maritime Lien
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2012), and thus subject to a maritime lien. Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739-41.
It noted that the policy justification for imposing such a lien-the risk that a vessel owner could
avoid creditors-was absent, since the floating home had no propulsion system, and the owner
"cannot easily escape liability by sailing away in his home." Id. at 743-44. The Court also
acknowledged that statutes in Florida and certain other jurisdictions treat floating homes "like
ordinary land-based homes rather than like vessels." Id. at 744.
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the plaintiffs desire to keep a handgun in his home for self-defense.1 6 6
The first line in Justice Scalia's majority opinion focused on this point:
"We consider whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the
possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second
Amendment to the Constitution."1 67 In striking down the statute, the
majority emphasized that the prohibition "extends, moreover, to the
home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute."1

68

Two years later, the Court ruled in McDonald v. City of Chicago that

'

the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the "Second Amendment right
recognized in Heller" against the states in another case where owners
sought to keep handguns in their homes.1 6 9 Notably, Justice Alito's
majority opinion characterized Heller as holding that "the Second
Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the
purpose of self-defense,", 7 0 rather than a broader right that would extend
outside of the home. The possession of handguns for home defense,
then, was the central justification for abandoning the traditional view that
the Second Amendment only applied to the operation of militias.' 7
The Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the Roberts Court reflects a
similar shift toward shielding the home. The Court applied the Katz
privacy-based test in the 2006 decision of Georgia v. Randolph, where

the issue was whether police could conduct a warrantless search of a
home where one co-occupant consented to the search, but another cooccupant objected.1 7 2 Yet in doing so it began the process of circling
back to the traditional property-based test which provided greater
protection for homes and the surrounding curtilage. Justice Souter's
majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, and
Ginsburg, stressed that the determination of reasonableness in Fourth
Amendment consent cases was closely tied to "widely shared social
expectations," which were "naturally enough influenced by the law of
property, but not controlled by its rules."1 73 Stressing the "centuries-old

166.

554 U.S. 570, 575-76 (2008).

167.
168.

Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
Id. at 628 (emphasis added).

169.

561 U.S. 742, 750, 791 (2010).

170.
Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
171.
For example, the Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), even though there the Seventh Circuit interpreted Heller as
applying only to handguns kept in the home.

172.
173.

547 U.S. 103, 106-08 (2006).
Id. at 111.
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principle of respect for the privacy of the home,"1 74 the Court found "no
recognized authority in law or social practice" 7 1 which allowed one cooccupant of a home to "open the door to a third party"176 over the
objection of another co-occupant and, accordingly, held that the search
was illegal.177
The Court's return to the property-based approach in United States v.
Jones'7 and Florida v. Jardinesl79 restricts warrantless home searches,
thus enlarging the rights of home owners and occupants. The six current
Justices who joined one or both opinions-Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan-thereby
endorsed the broad pro-home language that they contain.so Although
the property at issue in Jones was a vehicle, the Court's justification for
returning to the property-based approach was largely based on real
property law.' 8' It cited an eighteenth-century English decision for the
proposition that "[o]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred,
that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave;
if he does he is a trespasser." 8 2 Thus, an improper search would occur if
officials intruded on a "constitutionally protected area,"' 8 3 such as the
"curtilage of a home."18 4
Jardines, in turn, extended the property-based Jones approach to a
home, where police brought a drug-sniffing dog to an owner's porch in
an effort to search for marijuana."s Although the government argued
that the owner had no reasonable expectation of privacy on his front
porch and thus that the entry was legal under Katz, the Court held that
the police conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because it took place
"in a constitutionally protected area." 8 6 The majority opinion explained
that "when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among

174.
175.

Id. at 115 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999)).
Id. at 114.

176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 122-23. But see Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014) (refusing to
extend Randolph to the situation where one occupant is absent, but the other occupant consents).
178.
179.
180.

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947; Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1412.

181.

See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-53.

182.
Id. at 949 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P. 1765)).
183.
Id. at 951 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
184.
Id. at 953.
185.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413-17.
186.
Id. at 1415.
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equals," because the heart of the Amendment is a person's right to
"retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."'s 7 And the curtilage, the area immediately
surrounding the home which included the porch, is similarly protected. 8 8
The same orientation is evident in Jones v. Flowers, which was
decided under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 89
The broad issue was whether due process required a government entity to
take additional steps to provide notice to a property owner when its
mailed notices of a tax sale were returned as undeliverable.1 90 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the fact that the property
involved was a home: "In this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice
prior to the State extinguishing a property owner's interest in a home."191
When viewed within this framework, the Court concluded that the notice
was insufficient.1 9 2 It doubted that "a person who actually desired to
inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he
owns would do nothing" when a mailed notice was returned
unclaimed.19' And it reasoned that a sender of a returned letter would
normally try to resend it, especially "when, as here, the subject matter of
the letter concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss
of a house."194
Finally, this focus on safeguarding the home helps to explain the
Court's recent interpretation of the federal Fair Housing Act' 95 in Texas
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc.1 96
Enacted in 1968, the Act prohibits, inter alia,
discrimination based on race, color, and other factors in connection with

187.
Id. at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
188.
Id. at 1414-15.
189.
547 U.S. 220 (2006); see also Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (holding that the
Clean Water Act did not preclude pre-enforcement review of an EPA order which directed property
owners, who had filled an alleged wetland in preparation for constructing a home, to restore the land
to its natural condition); cf Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (using the home
as the paradigm for the most protected form of property, in the sentence "[t]he Government has a
categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home").
190.
Flowers, 547 U.S. at 223.
191.
Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
192.

Id. at 239.

193.
Id. at 229 (emphasis added). The dissenters, in contrast, complained that the "property
owner's own failure to be a prudent ward of his interests" was the source of the problem. Id. at 248
(Thomas, J., dissenting). "The meaning of the Constitution," they argued, "should not turn on the
antics of tax evaders and scofflaws." Id.

194.
195.
196.

Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (2012).
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
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the sale or rental of a home.1 97 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
explained that the Act was adopted against a backdrop of de facto
residential segregation in many areas of the nation: "Racially restrictive
covenants prevented the conveyance of property to minorities; steering
by real-estate agents led potential buyers to consider homes in racially
homogeneous areas; and discriminatory lending practices . . . precluded

minority families from purchasing homes in affluent areas."' 9 8
The issue was whether a defendant could be held liable under the Act
on a disparate-impact theory, without proof that it actually intended to
discriminate.199 In other words, could a plaintiff prevail based only on a
showing that the defendant's practice had a disproportionate impact on
minority groups and was not justified by any legitimate rationale? 200 In
holding that disparate-impact claims were cognizable, the Court focused
on the Act's "results-oriented language" and stressed that this outcome
was consistent with its statutory purpose: to eradicate housing
discrimination. 20 ' The majority opinion closed by acknowledging the
Act's "continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated
society." 2 02 By enabling more effective enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act, Texas Departmentof Housing & Community Affairs helps to assure

that all citizens have an equal right to the home of their choice.
Indeed, the only decision where the Roberts Court ruled against a
homeowner was Stop the Beach Renourishment.203 This outcome is
explained by the fact that all eight participating Justices concluded that
the underlying Florida Supreme Court decision under attack was correct
under state law, which rendered the constitutional issues moot.2 04 It is

also important to note that the case did not concern homes per se, but
rather the location of the seaward lot line of oceanfront homes.205

197.

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).

198.
Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2515 (citation omitted).
199.
Id. at 2513.
200.
The issue arose in an unusual factual setting. Plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, claimed
the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs allocated federal tax credits for lowincome housing projects in a manner that approved "too many credits for housing in predominantly
black inner-city areas and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods," thus
perpetuating housing segregation. Id. at 2514.
201.
Id. at 2525.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 2525-26.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
See id. at 733; id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 742 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 711 (plurality opinion).
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D. Government Distrust
The third distinctive theme evident in Roberts Court property
jurisprudence is heightened distrust of government-a sense that officials
cannot be relied upon to act in good faith in matters involving property
rights. Under this mindset, federal courts must craft their decisions to
safeguard owners against the serious risk that other branches of
government will engage in unreasonable or even abusive conduct. As
used in decisions involving state and local governments, this theme
sometimes results in minimizing concerns of federalism in favor of
justifying more robust federal action.206 Of course, it is often difficult to
determine whether anti-government statements in Supreme Court
decisions affect the outcome or are merely rhetorical flourishes. But
both the frequency and the stridency of these assertions increased during
the first decade of the Roberts Court. And at least in some majority and
plurality opinions, the distrust of government theme is woven into the
reasoning that supports the outcome.2 07 All eight current Justices have
either written or joined in majority opinions that reflect such distrust.
Property decisions rendered during the Burger and Rehnquist eras
generally did not display such distrust, except in occasional dissents.
Indeed, decisions from this era reflect a certain degree of deference to
government entities.
In the 1978 decision in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, for example, the Court crafted
the modem three-part test for determining if a regulatory taking had
occurred without expressing fear of governmental misconduct. 2 08 One of
the factors-whether the interference "arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good"-assumed that officials would act in good faith.209
Although the Court subsequently eroded the Penn Central approach in

206.
See, e.g., T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015) (rejecting city's
argument that interpreting federal statute to require it to state reasons for denial of cell phone tower
permit "would deprive it of local zoning authority").
But the Roberts Court has sometimes
employed the rhetoric of federalism in the property context. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (James Madison))
(noting that "[t]he Framers ... ensured that powers which 'in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people' were held by governments more local and more
accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy").
207.
In this context, it is important to distinguish between (a) expressions of government
distrust and (b) sarcasm in general. Sarcasm has certainly surfaced in Roberts Court decisions,
mainly directed at other Justices; but it is used for rhetorical emphasis, not to help justify the
substantive outcome.
208.
209.

See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
See id.
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Loretto,2 10 Lucas,2 1' Nollan,212 and Dolan,2 13 it did so without overtly
basing their rationales on fear of governmental oppression.214 Moreover,
in the 2002 decision of Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,2 15 the Court rejected the petitioners'
argument that it should adopt a per se rule for temporary takings in part
because this approach would find a taking "regardless of the good faith
of the planners" who adopted a moratorium, again assuming that officials
would act in good faith.2 16 Even in Kelo v. City of New London, decided
in the final year of Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure, the plurality opinion
deferred to the defendant city's decision to condemn the plaintiffs'
properties, without questioning the wisdom of the decision or the good
faith of city officials.217
The shift toward a more skeptical approach began in Jones v.
Flowers,2 1 8 one of the first Roberts Court decisions involving property
rights. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded that Arkansas violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to
provide a homeowner with adequate notice of a tax sale. 2 19 The central
theme in the opinion is that the state was unconcerned about the
adequacy of its notice: "We do not think that a person who actually
desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a
house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner

210.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
211.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Justice Scalia certainly touched on
the government mistrust theme in his majority opinion in Lucas when he noted that a regulation
which required land to be substantially left in its natural state carried the risk that it was "being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." Id. at
1018.
212.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).

213.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
214.
The Court justified the results in Loretto and Lucas, for example, by reference to supposed
traditional rules rather than on fear of government misconduct. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 ("historical
rule"); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 ("[a]s we have said on numerous occasions"). Nollan was also based
on an even-handed assessment, aside from an ideological flourish by Justice Scalia, who noted that
an improper permit condition would be "not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan
of extortion."' 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H.
1981), overruled by Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317 (N.H. 1988)). Scalia quoted this
same language in Dolan. 512 U.S. at 387 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., 432 A.2d at 14-15).

215.

535 U.S. 302 (2002).

216.

Id. at 337-38.

217.
218.

545 U.S. 469, 480-84 (2005).
547 U.S. 220 (2006).

219.

Id. at 239.
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is returned unclaimed."
Roberts complained:

2 20
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And in the closing paragraph of the opinion,

There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be less than fully
zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue it needs. The same
cannot be said for the State's efforts to ensure that its citizens receive
proper notice before the State takes action against them.221
The implication here is that officials are predominantly concerned with
enriching the state rather than protecting the rights of its citizens.
One year later, in Rapanos v. United States, the plurality opinion
written by Justice Scalia struck a similar note, this time directed against
regulations issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.222 The issue in
the case was the appropriate interpretation of the phrase "waters of the
United States" under the provisions of the Clean Water Act which
regulate the filling of wetlands.223 Scalia complained about an "immense
expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the
Clean Water Act-without any change in the governing statute-during
the past five Presidential administrations."2 24 The Army Corps of
Engineers, he asserted, "exercises the discretion of an enlightened
despot" in deciding whether to issue a permit to fill wetlands.225
Concurring in the decision, Chief Justice Roberts lamented that rather
than narrowing its authority over wetlands in response to prior Supreme
Court decisions, "the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless
view of the scope of its power." 226
Yet later that same year, in Wilkie v. Robbins,227 the Court resisted
temptation to rule against the federal government where its agents
allegedly engaged in a campaign of "harassment and intimidation" to
force a landowner to convey an easement over his land to the Bureau of

220.

Id. at 229.

221.
222.
223.

Id. at 239.
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
Id. at 729.

224.

Id. at 722.

225.
Id. at 721. Scalia also rejected the argument that Congress had acquiesced in the
challenged regulations, noting that the Court could not determine whether the failure of Congress to
act was attributable to its members' belief that the regulations were appropriate, their assumption
that the courts would correct any problems, "or indeed simply to their unwillingness to confront the
environmental lobby." Id. at 750.
226.
Id. at 758 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S.
Ct. 808, 815 (2015) (disregarding the city's argument that the Court's interpretation of federal statute
would "deprive it of local zoning authority").
227.

551 U.S. 537 (2007).
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Land Management, by declining to recognize a new Bivens action. 22 8
Indeed, Justice Souter's majority decision opined that even if "[t]he
action claimed to be retaliatory may gratify malice in the heart of the
official who takes it . .. the official act remains an instance of hard
bargaining intended to induce the plaintiff to come to legitimate
terms." 2 29 Dissenting, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens protested that
"[t]he constitutional guarantee of just compensation would be worthless
if federal agents were permitted to harass and punish landowners who
refuse to give up property without it." 23 0
The Court returned to the distrust theme in its 2010 plurality opinion
in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
EnvironmentalProtection, this time focused on state court judges. 23' As
noted above, Justice Scalia's opinion asserted the novel claim that the
Takings Clause encompassed the taking of property by judicial
decisions. 23 2 "It would be absurd," he asserted, "to allow a State to do by
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative
fiat." 2 3 3 In order to determine whether a state judicial decision has
"taken" a property right, he reasoned that federal courts must necessarily
be the final arbiter of what property rights exist under state law: "A
constitutional provision that forbids the uncompensated taking of
property is quite simply insusceptible of enforcement by federal courts
unless they have the power to decide what property rights exist under
state law." 234 Inherent in this view is the notion that state court judges
cannot be trusted to determine state law. As Scalia commented: "[O]ur
opinion does not trust judges with the relatively small power Justice
Kennedy now objects to. It is we who propose setting aside judicial
decisions that take private property ...
235
A similar, if muted, theme can be seen in the 2012 decision of
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, where Justice
Ginsburg's unanimous opinion identified the factors to be considered in
determining whether a temporary physical invasion of private property

228.
229.

Id. at 541.
Id. at 558 n.10.

230.

Id. at 584 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

231.
560 U.S. 702 (2010).
232.
See supra discussion Section III.B.4.
233.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 714 (citing Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 510 U.S.
1207, 1211-12 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
234.
Id. at 727.
235.
Id. at 720.
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by government should be deemed a compensable taking.236 The list
included a factor concerning the intentionality of government conduct:
"the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result
of authorized government action." 23 7 This factor-which implies
potential bad faith by government officials-had not previously surfaced
in the Court's modem takings jurisprudence.
Justice Alito struck the same anti-government cord in Sackett v. EPA
in 2012.23 He concurred in the majority opinion that property owners
were entitled to challenge administrative compliance orders issued under
the Clean Water Act, beginning his opinion with this sentence: "The
position taken in this case by the Federal Government-a position that
the Court now squarely rejects-would have put the property rights of
ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) employees." 2 39 He continued: "[T]he combination of the
uncertain reach of the Clean Water Act and the draconian penalties
imposed for the sort of violations alleged in this case still leaves most
property owners with little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA's
tune." 24 0 The clear implication of these remarks is that EPA officials
cannot be trusted.
In the 2013 decision of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management

District, where the Court extended the Nollan-Dolan rule, Justice Alito
centered his majority opinion on fear of government misconduct. 24 ' He
began by characterizing Nollan and Dolan as providing protection
against "the misuse of the power of land-use regulation." 24 2 Land use
applicants, he reasoned, were especially vulnerable to "coercion" and
"[e]xtortionate demands" by local officials. 2 4 3 "Extortionate demands for
property in the land-use permitting context," he explained, "run afoul of
the Takings Clause . . because they impermissibly burden the right not
to have property taken without just compensation." 244 Turning to the
monetary exactions issue, Alito asserted that the Nollan-Dolan test had
to be expanded to encompass demands for fees because otherwise "it
would be very easy for land-use permitting officials to evade the

236.
237.

133 S. Ct. 511, 522-23 (2012).
Id. at 522.

238.

132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375-76 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).

239.

Id. at 1375.

240.
241.
242.

Id.
See 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594-97 (2013).
Id. at 2591.

243.
244.

Id. at 2594-95.
Id. at 2596.
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limitations" of these decisions.24 5 The common themes running through
these justifications is that local officials are likely to both (a) make
extortionate demands on land developers and (b) seek to evade Supreme
Court rulings.
An echo of the government mistrust theme can also be seen in the
2015 decision of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, where eight
Justices agreed that the Takings Clause applied equally to real property
246
and personal property.
As discussed above, the case involved a federal
program intended to aid growers by stabilizing the price for raisins by
keeping part of the crop off the market-a program that most growers
supported.247 Yet Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion summarized
the Court's holding in this manner: "The Government has a categorical
duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it
takes your home." 24 8 The direct address to the reader ("your") and
substitution of a personally-owned item ("car") for tons of raisins
destined for commercial sale makes the holding more memorable. Yet it
virtually warns the reader against a supposed danger that the government
might try to seize his property without any payment.24 9
Admittedly, it can be difficult to distinguish rhetoric from reasoning
in Supreme Court opinions. But, at a minimum, the rationales in certain
Roberts Court decisions in property-related cases appear to be partially
premised on judicial fear of misconduct by other branches of
government, ranging from federal officials to local legislatures to state
courts. Taken to its logical extreme, the implication of this view is that
only federal courts may be relied upon to safeguard property rights.
Perhaps Justice Scalia reflected this mindset in his Stop the Beach
Renourishment plurality opinion when he proclaimed: "Where the power
of this Court is concerned, one must never say never." 250

245.
246.
247.

Id. at 2599.
135 S. Ct. 2419, 2423, 2425-28 (2015).
See supra discussion Section III.B.4.

248.
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426 (emphasis added).
249.
See also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (noting that the core of the Fourth Amendment was "the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion").
250.
(2010).

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 725
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E. "Property"Boundaries
1. Expanding Boundaries
The central question in American property law is simply stated:
What is "property"? The word is notoriously difficult to define. Indeed,
one scholar claims that "[t]he question is unanswerable." 25 1
The Roberts Court continues to use the traditional metaphor that
"property" may be viewed as a "bundle of rights," following in the
footsteps of prior Courts. Two decisions from the 2014 term illustrate
the point. In Henderson v. United States, 252 the Court unanimously held
that a federal statute that made it unlawful for a convicted felon to
"possess" a firearm did not eliminate the other "proverbial sticks in the
bundle of property rights."253 Thus, the government was not entitled to
prevent Henderson, a convicted felon, from exercising "the right merely
to sell or otherwise dispose of that item." 2 54 A few weeks later, in Horne
v. Department of Agriculture,255 the Court found that the federal
government had violated the Takings Clause because a government
program eliminated "the entire 'bundle' of property rights in the
appropriated raisins-'the rights to possess, use and dispose of' them." 25 6
But while the bundle of rights metaphor may be useful in deconstructing
the components of "property," it provides no real guidance about what
"property" is in the first instance.
The scope of laws that regulate property is inextricably intertwined
with the meaning of "property." For example, the Takings Clause and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provide different forms
of protection for "property." A court might enlarge the reach of the
Takings Clause either by broadening the meaning of the term "taken" or
the meaning of "property." In like fashion, the breadth of the Due
Process Clause is determined by the meaning of both "due process" and
"property." The same duality is evident in interpreting statutes and case

251.
John Edward Cribbit, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of
Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1.
252.
135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015).
253.
Id. at 1784.
254.
Id. at 1785; cf Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 76 (2007) (holding that a person who
trades drugs for a gun is not "using" a firearm "during ... [a] drug trafficking crime").
255.
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
256.
Id. at 2428 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982)); see also Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S.
193, 198 (2007) (noting that "the right to convey" is "one of the quintessential rights of property
ownership").
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law involving "property."
The Roberts Court is directly enlarging the substantive protection for
property, as discussed earlier in this Article.
But there are also
indications that the Court, or at least part of the Court, may be seeking to
do the same thing indirectly-by enlarging the boundaries of what
"property" means.2 57 Tentative efforts on this front can be identified in
three areas. First, is everything that has value "property"? Second,
should real property and personal property be given equal legal
protection as "property"? Finally, is the meaning of "property" protected
by the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause static or dynamic?
2. "Property" and Value
Courts and scholars have struggled for decades to define the meaning
of "property" as the term is used both in the Constitution and in federal
statutes. It has been traditionally accepted that states have the principal
role in defining the meaning of "property" as a general matter, 258 and that
federal courts will thus largely rely on state law to define the term. For
example, in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, a Burger era
decision, the Court explained that the creation and scope of property
interests were "defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law." 259
Yet this approach creates the risk of circularity, as Justice Kennedy
explained in two Rehnquist Court decisions. In his Lucas concurrence,
Kennedy noted that if "the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped
by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority,
property tends to become what courts say it is." 26 0 Kennedy's solution to
the circularity dilemma was to broaden the scope of owner expectations:
"The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective
rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties
involved ... in light of the whole of our legal tradition." 2 6 ' He expanded

257.
Cf Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 285-86 (2006)
(rejecting state's assertion that settlement proceeds were not "property" owned by the plaintiff).
258.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010)
(citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)) ("Generally speaking, state law
defines property interests...."); see also Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008) (observing
that a proposition "of which we have no doubt" is that "States may allocate property rights as they
see fit"); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 549 U.S. 443, 451 (2007) (quoting Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)) ("[P]roperty interests are created and defined by state law").
259.
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
260.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
261.
Id. at 1035.
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on this theme in his plurality opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,262
describing property as stemming from the "common, shared
understandings . . . derived from a State's legal tradition." 2 63
At bottom, these authorities seek to provide a process for
determining what constitutes "property" based on the facts of a particular
case, rather than providing a general definition. This is far from a
workable standard. Indeed, Kennedy has acknowledged that the Court
needs to develop a "neutral, stable, extrinsic" definition of property.264
The Roberts Court addressed a key issue in this definitional struggle
in Sekhar v. United States: is everything that may indirectly have value
"property"? 2 65 The case arose against a backdrop of earlier decisions
which held that not all valuable interests constituted "property." For
example, in the 1945 case of United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
the Court observed that "not all economic interests are 'property rights';
only those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of
them." 26 6 And during the final year of the Rehnquist era, the Court
observed in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales that an interest was not
"property" under the Fourteenth Amendment if it had no "ascertainable
monetary value."267 But Sekhar appears to contradict the Court's prior
holdings.2 68
Sekhar involved a vague and intangible "right" located on the fuzzy
border between property and non-property: an employee's right to make
a recommendation to his superior.2 69 The case required the Court to
interpret the Hobbs Act, which imposes criminal liability for extortion
related to interstate commerce; 270 the Act defines "extortion" to include
"obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by

262.
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
263.
Id. at 630 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30).
264.
Videotape: Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture-Property and Our Constitutional Tradition:
Some Hobbesian Sticks in the Lockean Bundle (Anthony M. Kennedy 1991) (on file with the
Gordon D. Schaber Law Library, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law).
265.
266.

See 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2726 (2013).
324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).

267.
545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 964 (2000)).
268.
It is certainly possible that the definitions of the term "property" as used in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments might differ among themselves, and also deviate from various statutory
definitions of the term. Conceding this arguendo, nothing in the Hobbs Act suggests that it uses the
term "property" in an unusual sense, and the Sekhar approach varies wildly from what must be
viewed as the core meaning of the term, whatever variance there may be on the margins.
269.

Sekhar, 133 S. Ct. at 2723.

270.

Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
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wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear." 2 7 1 The
issue was whether using threats "to compel a person to recommend that
his employer approve an investment" was obtaining "property" from
another.272 The Second Circuit held that the employee, the general
counsel of a state agency, "had a property right . .. to recommend-free
from threats-whether the [agency] should" invest in a fund managed by
a particular private firm.273 It accordingly upheld the defendant's
conviction. 274
The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision, but with
differing rationales that went beyond the statutory meaning of "property"
under the Act.275 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion. 2 76 Scalia
initially refused to decide whether the right to make such a
recommendation was "'property' in a broad sense or not"; but he
reasoned that even if it were, it was not property that could be transferred
to another-and thus not "obtainableproperty under the Hobbs Act." 277
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, concurred
in the result. 2 78 Alito noted that dicta in earlier decisions suggested that

property covered by the Act extended to "any valuable right considered
as a source or element of wealth," 2 79 and that Black's Law Dictionary
also endorsed this broad definition of the term. 28 0 But, concluding that
"the jury's verdict stretches the concept of property beyond the breaking
point," Alito reasoned that the right to make such a recommendation was
not "property" even if it might have some value. 281 He noted that
"[d]espite the breadth of some of these formulations," the term "plainly
does not reach everything that a person may hold dear; nor does it extend
to everything that might in some indirect way portend the possibility of
future economic gain."282 Alito based his analysis on the reasonable
expectations approach, noting that "[i]t is not customary to refer to an

271.
272.

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
Sekhar, 133 S. Ct. at 2723.

273.

United States v. Sekhar, 683 F.3d 436, 441 (2d Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2720 (2013).

274.
275.
276.

Id. at 443.
See Sekhar, 133 S. Ct. at 2726-27.
Id. at 2723.

277.

Id. at 2726.

278.
279.
280.

Id. at 2727 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2728 (quoting United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969)).
Id. (quoting Property, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)).

281.

Id.

282.
Id.; cf Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 777 n.3 (2010) (noting that the "sentimental value
of the property" is not relevant under the Bankruptcy Code).
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internal recommendation to make a government decision as a form of
property" and that "[i]t would seem strange to say that the government or
its employees have a property interest in their internal
recommendations."283
Justice Scalia responded to Alito's analysis in a footnote, indicating
that he was "not sure" whether the right was "property"; but he seemed
to suggest that any valuable item might be property: "If one defines
property to include anything of value, surely some rights to make
recommendations would qualify-for example, a member of the Pulitzer
Prize Committee's right to recommend the recipient of the prize." 28 4
Scalia went on to observe that "a prominent journalist would not give up
that right (he cannot, of course, transfer it) for a significant sum of
money-so it must be valuable." 28 5

Thus, five current Justices appear to agree that a right has
"value"-and thus constitutes "property"-if a person would not
surrender it in return for a monetary payment, even if (a) the right is not
transferable in the market sense and (b) it has no ascertainable monetary
value. But there is a plethora of "rights" in everyday life which a person
could conceivably give up in return for an undetermined amount of
money. This list might include the "rights" to apply for a job, eat meat,
enjoy art, drive a car, read a book, or look at a starry sky. None of these
"rights" have market value; nor are any transferable. Yet under the
majority approach, they are all arguably "property." This position would
dramatically enlarge what the law has traditionally viewed as "property,"
thereby expanding the protection that "owners" receive.
3. Real Property v. Personal Property
Another ongoing debate is whether real property is entitled to greater
protection than personal property. Rehnquist era opinions reflected such
a distinction, for example, in the context of the Takings Clause. In
Andrus v. Allard (1979), the Court held that a law prohibiting owners
from selling their eagle feathers was not a taking; 28 6 but in Hodel v.
Irving (1987) it held that a law prohibiting Native Americans from
devising their lands was a taking.2 87 Justice Scalia reflected on this

283.
284.
285.

Sekhar, 133 S. Ct. at 2728 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2726 n.5 (majority opinion).
Id.

286.

444 U.S. 51, 67-68 (1979).

287.

481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987).
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distinction in his majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council:
[I]n the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to
be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless (at least if the property's only
economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale). In the
case of land, however, we think the notion pressed by the Council that
title is somehow held subject to the "implied limitation" that the State
may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is
inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings

Clause

288

The clear implication is that a regulation which eliminates all economic
value of real property is a taking; but a regulation which has the same
impact on personal property is not. Thus, the jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court suggested that government probably has greater leeway
in regulating personal property than real property. The Roberts Court
rejects this view. More than any of its predecessors, the Roberts Court
has moved toward extending equal protection to both forms of
property. 289

The Roberts Court took the first steps toward eliminating any
distinction between real property and personal property under the
Takings Clause. Writing for the five-member majority in Koontz v. St.
John's River Water Management District,290 Justice Alito extended the
Nollan-Dolan approach from exactions of real property to encompass
demands for monetary payments. 2 9 ' Alito justified this shift on practical
grounds, noting that such fees are "functionally equivalent to other types
of land use exactions," that is, to government demands for exactions of
real property.292 Seemingly, then, the Nollan-Dolan rule now applies
equally to exactions of real property and money-and thus presumably to
any other form of personal property as well.293

288.
505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (citation omitted) (citing Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66-67).
289.
The Court also seemed to equate the two categories in McBurney v. Young, where it
explained that the right to "'property, either real or personal,' has long been seen as one of the
privileges of citizenship." 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1716 (2013) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,
552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)).
290.
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
291.
292.

See supra discussion Section III.B.4.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.

293.
Cf Robers v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1854, 1857-58 (2014) (concluding that the
statutory restitution obligation for loan fraud was reduced only by the proceeds received from the
sale of the collateral, not the value of the collateral itself, because the "property" at issue was money,
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Two years later, the Court examined the issue more broadly in Horne
v. Department of Agriculture.2 94 In the underlying decision, the Ninth
Circuit refused to find a taking of the Homes' raisins under Loretto, in
part based on the rationale that "the Takings Clause affords less
protection to personal than to real property." 29 5 It based this conclusion
mainly on the excerpt from Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas
quoted above.296 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts soundly
rejected this distinction in the context of a physical taking:
Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents,
suggests that the rule [governing takings] is any different when it
comes to appropriation of personal property. The Government has a
categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as
when it takes your home. 297
The Court explained away the Lucas dictum on the basis that that case
"was about regulatory takings, not direct appropriations." 298 Notably,
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan
all joined in this part of the opinion. 29 9 After Horne, it is clear that seven
current Justices believe that Loretto applies equally to physical takings of
real property and personal property.
In the wake of Koontz and Horne, it is increasingly likely that a
future Court will narrow the distinction between real property and
personal property under the Takings Clause in the context of regulatory
takings. Under the logic followed by the Horne Court, certainly nothing
in the text of the Clause justifies any distinction between the two. Yet
because commentators generally agree that the Framers did not
contemplate that the Clause would apply to regulations that merely
restrict the use of property,300 such textual analysis provides little
assistance. The central difficulty is that the Framers clearly intended
state and federal governments to exercise broad control over intrastate

not collateral).
294.
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
295.
Home v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1139-41 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992)), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
296.

Id. at 1139-40 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28).

297.
298.
299.

Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
Id. at 2427.
Id. at 2423.

300.
See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (observing that "early constitutional theorists did not
believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all").
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and interstate commerce-which would necessarily include restrictions
on the manufacture, sale, and possession of personal property.
Riley v. California,30' a recent Fourth Amendment decision, may
signal that the Roberts Court is also beginning to close the gap between
real property and personal property in other contexts.302 On its face, the
Amendment expressly extends to searches and seizures of both certain
real property ("houses") and personal property ("papers, and effects").303
Yet the Court has often given less protection to personal property which
is seized or searched outside of the home.
When Riley was searched incident to a traffic stop for expired
registration tags, officers seized his cell phone, examined its contents,
and found incriminating photos and videos.304 This evidence was
admitted at trial over Riley's objection that the officers had conducted a
warrantless search. 3 05 Writing for the eight-member majority, Chief
Justice Roberts reasoned that the search was improper. 306 Although it
was well-settled that officers could search an arrestee without a warrant,
Roberts explained that a cell phone was fundamentally different from
physical objects typically found in such a search, such as keys or
cigarettes. 307 Because a cell phone has immense data storage capacity,
he reasoned, its search poses a significant threat to personal
privacy-much like the search of a home: "Indeed, a cell phone search
would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house . . . ."308 Thus, seven current Justices
apparently agree that computers, tablets, and other digital media
interfaces will receive heightened protection under the Fourth
Amendment-akin to the protection accorded to the family
home-despite their traditional classification as personal property.
4. Static Property v. Dynamic Property
Is the definition of "property" as used in the Due Process Clause and
Takings Clause static or dynamic? The Supreme Court has addressed

301.
302.
"tangible
303.
304.

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
But cf Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088-89 (2015) (finding that a fish is not a
object" for the purposes of criminal liability under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480-81.

305.
306.

Id. at 2481.
Id. at 2479, 2494-95.

307.

Id. at 2491.

308.

Id. at 2489, 2491.
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this issue to some extent in the past. But the debate between Justices
Scalia and Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment309 may provide

'

new insight into how the Court will approach the issue in the
future-with implications for how far the Constitution protects property
rights.
The foundation of the American property law system is English law
as it existed before 1776. As Morton Horwitz has observed, the English
system was rooted in a "static agrarian conception" of property
law3 10-and accordingly, a static view of what constituted "property." 31
Yet a body of American property law began to arise in the nineteenth
century as judges altered English doctrines to meet conditions in the
United States, which were quite different from those in England. As
American courts retooled English property law doctrines in order to
encourage the development of wilderness lands, mainly for agricultural
use, the meaning of "property" evolved over time. 312
The American wilderness had largely disappeared by the dawn of the
twentieth century, but population growth and urbanization created new
pressures on property law. In this setting, the Court again acknowledged
that the permissible scope of property law-and thus the definition of
"property" itself-must evolve in response to changing conditions. The
foundation of modem land use regulation is the 1926 decision in Village
of Euclid v.

Ambler Realty Co., where

the

Court upheld the

constitutionality of comprehensive zoning against due process and equal
protection attacks.3 13 It noted that the increasing urbanization and
population growth of the era justified "additional restrictions in respect
of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities . .
309.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
310.
MORTON J. HoRwIrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31
(1977).
311.
See generally John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63
U. CHI. L. REv. 519 (1996). England was a mature agrarian economy, where most of the land
surface was already in productive use, primarily as crop land and permanent pasture. But the United
States was essentially a wilderness nation, largely in the same primeval state which existed before
European colonization. As Justice Story explained in an early Supreme Court decision, "[t]he
country was a wilderness, and the universal policy was to procure its cultivation and improvement."
Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137, 145 (1829).
312.
See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Property Rights in the Balance-The Burger Court and
ConstitutionalProperty, 43 MD. L. REv. 518, 518 (1984) ("The concept ofproperty is not static ....
Because circumstances have changed significantly since the colonial era, to the modern layman or
lawyer the concept of property differs from that intended by the colonial farmers and merchants who
drafted and ratified the Constitution.").
313.
272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
(noting that "some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power").
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[that] a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive."3 14 Accordingly, it reasoned
that the scope of the application of constitutional guarantees concerning
property must "expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their
operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be
otherwise."3

15

In recent decades, the static-dynamic dispute has largely been framed
in terms of whether a compensable taking has occurred under the Fifth
Amendment. Under the Takings Clause "property" may not be "taken"
by the federal government for "public use" unless just compensation is
provided to the owner.3 16 By necessity, there is a close relationship
between the definition of "property" and the standard for determining
when property is "taken." Although the Court has focused on defining
property in terms of the reasonable expectations of the owner, it has not
clearly decided whether such expectations might change over time.
The static-dynamic fissure surfaced during the Rehnquist era in
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,3 17 as evidenced by the contrast
between Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. Scalia seemed to concede that the definition of property
might change over time to some extent-without giving rise to takings
liability-when he noted that "[i]t seems to us that the property owner
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to
time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate
exercise of its police powers." 3 1 8 But he stressed the limited scope of this
approach: when a regulation prohibited "all economically beneficial use
of land" it would constitute a taking unless it was justified by
"background principles [that] ...
the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership." 3 19 This reference to
"background principles" implied a static set of property doctrines.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence took a broader approach, stressing that an
owner's "reasonable expectations" should be "understood in light of the
whole of our legal tradition," which envisioned gradual changes in
property rights over time. 3 20 Thus, "[t]he State should not be prevented

314.
315.
316.

Village ofEuclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
Id. at 387.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

317.
318.
319.
320.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1029.
See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing
conditions .... The Takings Clause does not require a static body of
state property law." 3 2 ' Dissenting, Justice Stevens complained that the
majority approach "effectively freezes the State's common law, denying
the legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law governing
the rights and uses of property." 3 22
In the Roberts Court, the static-dynamic dispute has widened from a
fissure into a chasm. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion, which announced that if a court "declares that what was once an
established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that
property." 3 23 Under this logic, property law is forever frozen in time
regardless of any changed circumstances that might justify modification.
This is an avowedly originalist view of property rights, which echoes the
approach of the Roberts Court in its Second and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence-examining the scope of the respective rights to possess
guns and be free from home searches, as defined by eighteenth-century
law.
Concurring in the result and joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice
Kennedy noted that "[s]tate courts generally operate under a commonlaw tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property
law." 32 4 Because "owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to
make certain changes in property law," he reasoned, an "incremental
modification" by government action would not violate the
325
Constitution.32 In other words, the scope of property rights may change
over time to some extent as the expectations of property owners evolve.
Kennedy cited the example of the traditional common law rule governing
liability when roots from a tree located on one owner's property damage
an adjacent property: "If a court deems that, in light of increasing
urbanization, the former rule for allocation of these costs should be
changed, thus shifting the rights of the owners, it may well increase the
value of one property and decrease the value of the other." 3 26 But under
Kennedy's approach, this would probably be consistent with the
Constitution.

321.
322.
323.
(2010).
324.

Id.
Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715
Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Id. at 738.

326.

Id.

2016

PROPERTY AND THE ROBERTS COURT

47

In turn, Scalia insisted that the definition of "property" was static.
He asserted that Kennedy's above analysis was "an astounding
statement." 327 "[I]t is not true," he asserted, that the "'common-law
tradition ... allows for incremental modifications to property law,' so
that 'owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain
changes in property law."' 328 This position went well beyond the
position he and others had supported in Lucas, where he appeared to
concede that property rights could be modified by government action, at
least to some extent, without incurring liability for a taking.329
The historical record overwhelmingly supports the Kennedy
position. American courts have routinely modified the common law
rights of property owners for centuries in response to changing
conditions-without any serious argument that this violated the
Constitution. While there are many examples, one illustration suffices to
make the point. Consider the easement by necessity. Suppose that A,
who has title to a large tract of land that adjoins a public road, conveys
part of the land to B. Under the traditional view, B is entitled to an
easement by necessity over A's retained land to reach the road only if B
can establish strict necessity, that is, if B had no legal right of access to a
public road when A severed title. Under the Scalia approach, one might
argue that A has an "established right of private property" to avoid
imposition of an easement by necessity over his land unless strict
necessity exists. But over time, changing conditions have led most
American courts to reject the strict necessity standard in favor of the
reasonable necessity approach. B, the party seeking the easement, need
only show that it is beneficial or convenient to her land. This arguably
"eliminates" the right of landowners like A to avoid such easements.
Scalia presumably would have argued that this is a compensable
taking-though no landowner has ever made such a claim. In turn,
Kennedy would probably find no taking on the basis that the reasonable
expectations of landowners evolve over time.

327.
328.

Id. at 722 (plurality opinion).
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 736, 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

329.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992). Scalia's position here
seems to be inconsistent with his dissent in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), where the
issue was whether a wife could authorize a search of her husband's house. Id. at 106. He noted that
"[n]o one supposes that the meaning of the Constitution changes as States expand and contract
property rights." Id. at 144 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, even if a wife could not authorize such a
search in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, "the fact that current property law provides
otherwise is ... [not] troublesome for the originalist." Id. These statements appear to concede that a
husband's historic right to exclude could be restricted by state law which would, in turn, narrow the
scope of the husband's Fourth Amendment protection.
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In short, a static definition of "property" is inconsistent with the
American legal tradition. Decisions of American courts routinely alter,
restrict, or even eliminate property rights over time, consistent with the
common law tradition, as they gradually respond to changing economic,
social, geographical, and technological conditions.
Absent unusual
circumstances, a property owner cannot hold a "legitimate expectation"
that her property rights will never be impaired by government
action-and thus Kennedy would argue that no compensation is due.
In summary, three current Justices (Roberts, Thomas, and Alito)
endorse the static approach to the definition of "property" as embodied in
the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality opinion; two Justices
(Kennedy and Sotomayor) disagree; and the remaining three Justices
(Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) have not yet taken a position on the issue.
Taken to its logical extreme the static approach would require either that
(a) courts refrain from deciding cases in a manner that might modify
property law or (b) the government compensate owners for such changes.
Neither outcome is palatable.
The first alternative abandons our
common law tradition. And the second invokes Justice Holmes' warning
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that "[g]overnment hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law."330
IV. THE PATH AHEAD: PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE IN THE POST-SCALIA
ERA

Justice Scalia was an outspoken champion of property rights who
profoundly influenced the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts during his thirty-year tenure. But his passing is unlikely to signal
a major change in the Court's approach to property issues. The most
profound effect of his absence will be to slow the pace at which the
Court's property jurisprudence expands.
One prediction is relatively easy: the Roberts Court will not reverse
any of its core decisions interpreting the scope of protection for
constitutional property under the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court traditionally applies stare decisis with more
stringency in cases involving property rights than in most other types of
cases, because of the belief that owners are likely to change their
positions in reliance on these holdings. All the current members of the
Court have embraced various formulations of this precept. In the 2015
330.

260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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decision of Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, for example, five
current Justices-joined by Scalia-endorsed the statement in Justice
Kagan's majority opinion that because property rights were entitled to a
"superpowered form of stare decisis, we would need a superspecial
justification" to overrule a decision in this area.33 ' But no "superspecial
justifications" for reversing any of these decisions can be imagined at
this point.
It also seems unlikely that Scalia's absence will alter the
fundamental pro-owner orientation of the Roberts Court. The Court's
veneration of property rights is reflected in the unanimous decision of
McBurney v. Young, which emphasized that "the right to 'take, hold and
dispose of property . . .' has long been seen as one of the privileges of
citizenship." 332
Consider, for example, the scope of the Takings
Clause-perhaps the most controversial issue in modem constitutional
property jurisprudence. The Roberts Court decided five cases on this
subject before Scalia's death: Wilkie, Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Koontz, Horne, and Arkansas Game & Fish Commission.33 3 Scalia
agreed with the outcome of all five decisions, but this only affected the
result in Koontz.3 3 4 In the other four cases, majorities of seven or eight
Justices agreed on the result-so Scalia's vote made no difference in the
outcome.335 As this example suggests, owners will generally continue to
win in the Roberts Court in civil property-related disputes.
Beyond this point, predicting the future trajectory of the Court's
property jurisprudence is more difficult. Inevitable changes in the
composition of the Court, as Scalia and perhaps others are replaced, will
obviously affect its direction. But it appears that the four trends analyzed
above will continue to shape the Court's property jurisprudence for some
time to come, if perhaps with less force.
First, the propertization of the Constitution is likely to continue in
Scalia's absence, if at a more gradual pace. It is important to remember
that the strong pro-owner orientation of the Roberts Court shows no
signs of abating. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Alito, in particular, have emerged as leaders in the Court's modem
property jurisprudence.
Their future opinions will undoubtedly be

331.

135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015).

332.
133 S. Ct. 1709, 1716 (2013) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823)).
333.
See supra Section III.B.4.
334.
See id.
335.
See id.
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affected by Scalia's views, but will also certainly diverge from them in
meaningful ways. The most important difference may be that Scalia
forcefully advocated for groundbreaking expansions of property
rights-as reflected in his Second and Fourth Amendment decisions and
his ambitious dicta in Stop the Beach Renourishment-rather than
incremental advances. Based on their past opinions, Roberts, Kennedy,
and Alito, by contrast, will probably focus on more gradual extensions,
and there is every reason to believe that other Justices will concur in this
approach.
The parameters of the Court's sweeping Second and Fourth
Amendment decisions will undoubtedly be the subject of extensive
litigation, requiring it to refine these holdings. Because Justice Scalia
was the most passionate supporter of these rulings, his absence from the
Court will affect the outcome. It seems likely that the scope of Heller
and McDonald will be narrowly confined to their facts-essentially
allowing possession of certain weapons in the home-rather than
expanded more broadly as Scalia presumably desired.33 6 And the JonesJardines definition of "constitutionally protected areas" will probably
need clarification as a plethora of new cases will test its outer limits.
The Court's future Takings Clause jurisprudence is more
problematic. Based on its first decade, it is reasonable to believe that the
Roberts Court will continue to expand its scope-but without bold leaps.
In particular, Stop the Beach Renourishment is a virtual invitation for
property owners to claim that a judicial taking has occurred, under either
the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause. The vague distinction in
Koontz between a monetary exaction and a tax will require clarification.
Future cases in both areas will give the Court the opportunity to redefine
the borders of these doctrines.
Second, it is likely that future decisions of the Roberts Court will be
affected by its unusually strong pro-home orientation, which is shared by
all the current Justices. Accordingly, it seems probable that the Court
will continue to enlarge legal protection for the home in constitutional
doctrine. For example, the Court might determine that a higher degree of
"public use" is required before government may condemn a home or
even revitalize the dormant Third Amendment by extending it to new

336.
For example, in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), the Court
refused to review the Circuit Court's ruling which interpreted Heller as applying only to possession
of weapons within the home. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' dissent from the denial of
certiorari, which maintained that Heller also extended to possession of weapons outside of the home.
Id. at 447-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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situations.
It is also conceivable that the Court could employ the
proverbial "thin end of the wedge" approach, gradually widening proowner doctrines developed in home-protective decisions to encompass
other forms of property, thereby broadening protection for property
rights in general.1

7

Third, the Roberts Court may continue to weave professed fear of
government misconduct into the rationales for its future property
decisions, though this is less certain after Scalia's death. All the current
Justices have either written or joined multiple opinions that express such
distrust.338 To some extent, this development mirrors public sentiment.
For example, during the Roberts Court era, the percentage of Americans
who trust the federal government has significantly declined. 33 9 In this
atmosphere, it is unsurprising that the Stop the Beach Renourishment
plurality would proclaim that the federal judiciary was "the branch of
government whose procedures are, by far, the most protective of
individual rights."340 But the Court's apparent reliance on distrust of
other branches of government as a substantive rationale for its property
decisions is troubling.
Fourth, the Roberts Court will inevitably need to confront the
definition of "property" in future cases. The trend toward equating real
property and personal property seems likely to continue, as evidenced by
Horne-where six current Justices joined Chief Justice Roberts' opinion
that no distinction was appropriate.34 ' Similarly, five current Justices
appear to concur that a "right" may be "property" even if it has no
ascertainable market value; it remains to be seen, however, whether they
will adhere to this position when the issue is central to the outcome.
Lastly, the tension between the static property and dynamic property
theories is likely to remain unresolved for some time. Although Justice
Scalia's absence will weaken support for the static theory, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas will undoubtedly continue to

337.
Cf Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) (extending
the Nollan-Dolan standard from real property exactions to monetary payments, in part, because
otherwise the government could "evade" that standard).
338.
See supra Section III.D.
339.
In September, 2005, 31% of Americans reported that they would "trust the government in
Washington to do what is right" either "just about always" or "most of the time," and by October,
2015, only 19% of Americans answered the same way. Beyond Distrust: How Americans View
Their Government, PEW RES. CTR.
149-50 (Nov. 23,
2015), http://www.peoplepress.org/files/2015/11/11-23-2015-Governance-release.pdf.
340.
(2010).

341.

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 720

See Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2015).
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press the Court to adopt it in the future.
APPENDIX

This study examined all Supreme Court decisions that met four
criteria: (1) the underlying case involved a property-related dispute;3 42
(2) the case was argued before the Court during the tenure of Chief
Justice Roberts;3 43 (3) the case was decided before Justice Scalia's
death; 344 and (4) one party to the case was a property owner345 as a

petitioner or respondent and the opposing party was a government
entity.346
A.

CIVIL PROPERTY-RELATED DECISIONS BY THE ROBERTS COURT

Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006): legality of possession and use of hallucinogenic tea
under Religious Freedom Restoration Act; owner wins.
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006): adequacy of notice of tax
sale of home under Due Process Clause; owner wins.
Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268
(2006): validity of lien imposed by state on settlement fund under federal
Medicaid statutes; owner wins.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006): validity of
regulations defining wetlands under Clean Water Act which restrict
owners from building; owners win.

342.
This study takes a broad view of what constitutes a "property-related dispute," including
disputes that go well beyond core property doctrines, as the case lists below demonstrate.
343.
The first day on which the Court heard oral argument under Chief Justice Roberts was
October 3, 2005, the first day ofthe 2005 term.
344.
Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016. None of the decisions from the Court's 2015
term that were issued before his death qualify for inclusion in this study.
345.
The definition of "owner" includes (a) persons holding nonfreehold estates and (b) persons
or entities who are acting as a surrogate for an owner by asserting a pro-property rights position,
such as a trade association acting on behalf of members who own property.
346.
This category includes suits against officials employed by government entities. It should
be noted that under this approach, cases involving intellectual property, bankruptcy, Native
American rights, and certain other cases which might be viewed as involving "property-related
disputes" are omitted from the study because they do not involve a government entity as a party.
Tax cases are similarly omitted due to their tenuous connection to property rights.
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Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007): authority of
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases to
mitigate coastal flooding; owners (state and private parties representing
owner side) win.
Envtl. Def v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007): validity of
regulations concerning replacement of electric generators under Clean
Air Act; owner loses.
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007): validity of ordinances concerning solid
waste under Interstate Commerce Clause; owner (trade group
representing owners) loses.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007): right of
owner of industrial facility to sue federal government for partial
reimbursement of CERCLA cleanup costs; owner wins.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007): liability of government
employees for allegedly trying to obtain easement from landowner by
abusive means; owner loses.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): validity of
District of Columbia ordinances which effectively prohibit possession of
a handgun in the home under the Second Amendment; owner wins.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599
(2009): liability of landowners to government for CERCLA cleanup
costs; owners win.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560
U.S. 702 (2010): legality of judicial decision which allegedly takes
property rights from coastal landowners under Takings Clause; owner
group loses.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010): validity of city
ordinances that effectively prohibit possession of a handgun in the home
under the Second Amendment; owners win.
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Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011):
liability of power plant owners for greenhouse gas emissions under
nuisance law; owners win.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011): validity of law that
restricts sale and use of pharmacy records; owner side wins.
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011): validity of
statute under First Amendment which restricts sales and other transfers
of certain video games to minors; owners win.
Nat'lMeatAss'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012): validity of statute
that bans slaughter of animals; trade group representing owners wins.
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012): ability of landowners to
challenge enforcement decision under Clean Water Act; owners win.
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012): ability of neighboring landowner to
challenge government decision to allow tribe to take land into trust;
owner wins.
Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012):
liability of federal government under Takings Clause for downstream
flooding; owner side wins (state acting in capacity of private owner).
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013): validity of
maritime lien imposed on floating home; owner wins.
Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013): validity of
lien imposed by state on settlement fund under federal Medicaid statutes;
owner wins.
Horne v. Dep't ofAgric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013): ability of owners to
challenge decision of federal agency to seize raisins; owners win.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013):
liability of state agency under Takings Clause for imposing development
mitigation fee; owners win.
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Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257
(2014): entitlement of government to easement on real property; owner
wins.
T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808 (2015): legality
of city's decision to refuse permit for construction of cell tower; owner
wins.
Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015): liability of
government under Takings Clause for seizure of raisins; owners win.
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015): legality of
ordinance under Fourth Amendment which allows police to search hotel
records; owner side wins (represented by trade group).
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015): ability of property owners to sue under the Fair
Housing Act on a disparate-impact theory; owner side wins.
B.

CRIMINAL PROPERTY-RELATED DECISIONS BY THE ROBERTS

COURT

Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006): liability of government agents
under Bivens for damage to computer equipment taken from owners;
owners lose.
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner wins.
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006): right of inmate under First
Amendment to have access to newspapers, magazines, and photos;
owner loses.
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Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S.
Amendment decision; owner loses.
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609 (2007): Fourth

Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007): interpretation of
criminal statute concerning "use" of a firearm; owner wins.
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008): liability of
prison officials for mishandling inmate's belongings; owner loses.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009): Fourth Amendment decision;
owner wins.
Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010): right of defendant
under First Amendment to possess photos depicting animal cruelty;
owner wins.
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011): Fourth Amendment decision;
owner loses.
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012): Fourth Amendment
decision; owners win.
Ryburn v. Huff 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012): Fourth Amendment decision;
owners lose.
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.
Amendment decision; owner loses.

Ct.

1235 (2012): Fourth
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S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012): liability of
defendant for storing hazardous waste on its land; owner wins.
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012): legality of statute
under First Amendment that criminalizes wearing unearned medals;
owner wins.
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner wins.
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013): Fourth Amendment decision;
owner loses.
Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014): legality under Sixth
Amendment of protective order freezing assets of criminal defendants;
owners lose.
Fernandezv. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014): Fourth Amendment
decision; owners win.
Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014): Fourth Amendment
decision; owners lose.
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014): Fourth Amendment
decision; owner loses.
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015): interpretation of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act regarding whether a fish is a "tangible object";
owner wins.
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.
Amendment decision; owner wins.

Ct.

1609 (2015): Fourth

Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015): interpretation of
statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon; owner wins.

